<span>This study investigates the nature of control rights and experience among oil company competitors as they collaborate to develop mutually owned oil and gas development projects. Using fundamental pinciples derived from Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights theories in conjunction with archival joint venture data, I attempt to empirically explain Joint Venture performance with respect to operational control. The typical oil-field Joint Venture governance model (the Joint Operating Agreement -- or JOA) is designed to minimize transaction costs and equitably distribute benefits in accordance with Transaction Cost Economics Theory Property Rights Theory, however, may more accurately descirbe JOA partner behavior by accounting for residual rights of control. While residual rights are thought to be a strong predictor of partner investment behavior and thus alliance success, the JOA is unique, in that it establishes an unusual situation whereby residual control rights (derived from operational control) are decoupled from ownership. In other words, within the JOA, equity ownership may not necessarily equate directly to the distribution of control rights. In the case of residual rights decoupling within two party and multiparty competitor partnerships, unique situations exist in which operational control and experience can be isolated from partner ownership and studied. In this paper I </span><span>present a number of findings highlighting partner control and its impact on Joint Venture success. I discovered that the number of partners within a Joint Venture does not significantly affect project success, suggesting that concentrated operational control negates the impact of multiparty administrative transaction costs. However, contrary to Property Rights Theory, I found that equity ownershp above a controlling interest does not have an effect on project success. In accordance with Transaction Cost Economics, I note that Experience has a significant, beneficial impact on JV success. However, not all experience is equal. Contrary to common practitioner assumptions, I found that a very specific type of experience (i.e. the Non-Operational Experience of the Operator) was most beneficial to the JV. These findings are notable from a scholar's as well as practitioner's perspective. Scholars will discover unique empirical evidence comparing Transaction Cost Economics with Property Rights models in an environment of decoupled operational control. Practitioners will find this research useful to optimize ownership and control within their Joint Venture portfolios and develop strategies to balance operational and non-operational corporate experience. Finally, Governments can use these findsing to guide ownership policy within Natural Resource development projects.Doctorate of Management Programs</span>
